There’s a particular kind of engineer Jira rewards, and it isn’t always the one you want building your product.
I watched this happen firsthand. Over a couple of years, our team’s culture shifted from “let’s find the best way to solve this” to “let’s close the ticket.” The tool didn’t do this on its own, but the way we used it did. The damage wasn’t abstract: good people left. The people who stayed were, on average, less capable at the actual craft of engineering than the ones who walked away.
The uncomfortable part is that nobody intended this outcome. We thought we were improving planning, transparency, and accountability. What we were really doing was teaching engineers that visible activity mattered more than thoughtful engineering.
The Story-Sizing Trap
Story pointing is supposed to help teams plan. In practice, on my team, it became a performance metric in disguise.
Every task was sized, every sprint produced a velocity number, and that number was watched by people who didn’t write code but cared deeply about whether it went up or down.
Once that happens, the incentive structure is set.
Nobody explicitly said, “Stop thinking and start closing tickets.” But the system rewarded exactly that behaviour.
- Research doesn’t close tickets.
- Evaluating three possible approaches before choosing the right one doesn’t close tickets.
- Refactoring something so that the next six months of work become easier doesn’t close tickets.
- Deep debugging rarely closes tickets quickly.
Only a closed ticket closes a ticket.
As a result, the smart, curious engineers—the ones who wanted to understand why something was broken instead of merely hiding the symptom—started to look like underperformers. Their velocity appeared lower. Their story-point totals accumulated more slowly.
It didn’t matter that their fixes were more durable, or that their code required less rework later. The dashboard had no column for “prevented next quarter’s outage.”
Working Smart Became Invisible, Working Hard Became Theater
There used to be a meaningful distinction between working hard and working smart.
Jira flattened that distinction.
Story points don’t measure judgment; they measure throughput. And throughput is surprisingly easy to game if you’re willing to slice work into small enough pieces.
That’s exactly what happened.
A subset of the team—often the more average technical performers—figured out that the game was no longer “solve problems” but “generate tickets.”
A straightforward feature would be split into 30, 40, sometimes more than 100 tiny tasks, many barely worth the overhead of creating them.
Every one of those tickets could be closed. Every closed ticket became a visible unit of “hard work.” The burndown chart looked fantastic.
The software itself did not become significantly better, faster, or easier to maintain.
Meanwhile, an engineer who spent two days understanding a nasty concurrency bug instead of applying a five-minute band-aid appeared, on paper, to have done less work. They had a single ticket sitting in In Progress for days.
To anyone glancing at the board, that looked like underperformance.
In reality, it was often the opposite.
The Robots Stayed, the Thinkers Left
This was the hardest part to watch.
The engineers who cared about doing the work well—the ones who wanted to research an approach, propose a better architecture, or simply have enough uninterrupted time to think—gradually became exhausted.
Some received mediocre performance reviews because their point totals didn’t compare favourably with the ticket farmers. Others simply grew tired of a system that punished depth and rewarded visible busywork.
Eventually, many of them left for teams that measured outcomes instead of ticket counts.
Who stayed?
Mostly the people who had adapted to the system rather than resisted it. Not bad people—just people who had correctly learned that the safest path to looking successful was to generate volume:
- Break work into the smallest possible pieces.
- Avoid ambiguous problems because they don’t size cleanly.
- Stay away from research tasks because they don’t produce satisfying green checkmarks.
- Prefer predictable ticket flow over difficult engineering questions.
Over time, the team’s average technical judgment declined even as its reported velocity increased.
We became extremely efficient at closing tickets and noticeably less effective at deciding which tickets were worth creating in the first place.
Outsourcing Makes This Worse, Not Better
If ticket-gaming is a subtle problem on an in-house team, it becomes a structural one the moment you bring in an outside vendor.
I’ve seen this pattern repeatedly on outsourced projects, regardless of which country the vendor was based in.
The client-side stakeholders—usually directors or VPs several layers removed from the code—don’t read diffs and don’t sit in on debugging sessions. What they see is the Jira dashboard:
- tickets opened,
- tickets closed,
- velocity trending upward quarter after quarter.
That dashboard becomes the proof of value for a contract that may be costing hundreds of thousands of dollars per year.
Vendors optimising for contract renewal rather than codebase health learn very quickly that the dashboard is the product.
So the same behaviour appears again, only amplified:
- A single feature is fragmented into dozens of trivial tickets.
- A simple bug fix becomes five separate tasks: investigate, reproduce, implement, test, verify.
- Each task is closable.
- Each closure becomes a data point in a status report.
The metrics look impressive. The architecture quietly deteriorates underneath.
Technical debt accumulates because technical debt is not what the dashboard measures.
The result is a slow-motion divergence between the story the metrics tell and the story the codebase tells.
Year One
- High ticket counts.
- Impressive velocity.
- Glowing status reports.
- Happy stakeholders.
Year Three
- The codebase is harder to change.
- Incidents happen more frequently.
- Onboarding new engineers takes far longer than it should.
- Simple changes require touching fragile, poorly understood components.
Nobody can point to the exact moment things went wrong because the reporting system never showed a decline.
It couldn’t.
It was never measuring the thing that mattered.
This is why so many outsourced software projects either fail outright or quietly bleed value for years before anyone notices: ticket throughput was never a good proxy for a maintainable, working product.
The vendor may not even be acting in bad faith. They are often responding rationally to a contract that rewards visible activity rather than engineering judgment.
Rational responses to bad incentives still produce bad outcomes.
Jira Isn’t the Villain—But It Isn’t Innocent Either
To be fair, Jira didn’t force anyone to behave this way.
A healthy engineering culture with thoughtful leadership can absolutely use Jira while still protecting space for research, deep work, and technical judgment.
The failure was organisational, not purely technological.
But I also don’t think the tool is entirely neutral.
Jira’s design vocabulary—story points, velocity charts, burndown graphs, sprint reports—naturally encourages people to treat ticket throughput as a proxy for value delivered.
That proxy is wrong often enough, and quietly enough, that many organisations never realise they have optimised for the wrong thing until their strongest engineers are gone and the remaining team is composed of people who are excellent at Jira and only average at engineering.
What I’d Do Differently
If I were leading that team again, I wouldn’t ban Jira.
I would ban the assumption that Jira metrics tell you who is contributing the most.
Planning tools are useful for coordinating work. They are dangerous when they become surrogate performance-review systems.
I would explicitly create protected space for work that rarely looks impressive on a board:
- research spikes,
- architectural exploration,
- deep debugging,
- refactoring,
- technical debt reduction,
- mentoring,
- and the freedom to occasionally be slow because you are being thorough rather than fast because you are being superficial.
I would also treat unusually high ticket throughput as a signal to investigate, not automatically as evidence of exceptional performance.
Sometimes the most productive engineer on the team is the one with fewer tickets closed, because they are solving the problems that prevent everyone else from drowning in tickets later.
The Real Cost
The biggest cost of optimising for Jira metrics is not bad charts, inflated velocity, or bloated backlogs.
It is the gradual loss of the people who care about understanding systems deeply.
Those engineers are often the ones who:
- challenge weak architectural decisions,
- prevent future outages,
- simplify complexity before it becomes unmanageable,
- and quietly raise the technical standards of everyone around them.
They are also the people most likely to become frustrated by environments that reward visible busyness over thoughtful engineering.
If your dashboards celebrate ticket volume more than customer outcomes, system reliability, or long-term maintainability, you may already be training your team to optimise for the wrong thing.
And by the time the metrics finally stop looking good, the people who could have warned you about it may already be working somewhere else.
You’ll still have plenty of tickets getting closed.
What you may no longer have is a team that knows which tickets are worth solving, which problems are worth understanding, and which shortcuts will become next year’s disaster.
That is a much harder thing to measure than velocity.
And a much more expensive thing to lose.
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